To What Extent Should Directors Be Liable for Insolvent Trading? Lessons from Australia’s Proposed Reform
Introduction
The Australian Government, in its Improving
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Laws Proposals Paper issued on 29 April 2016 (“Proposal”), has proposed, inter alia, to introduce a “safe harbour” for directors from
personal liability for insolvent trading. This newsletter will give a brief
introduction of the safe harbour provision and discuss its applicability in
Hong Kong.
Liability
for Insolvent Trading
Currently, under section 588G of the Australian
Corporations Act 2001, a company director may be liable, if:-
1.
he is a
director of a company at the time when the company incurs a debt;
2.
the company is
insolvent at that time, or becomes insolvent by incurring that debt; and
3.
at that time,
there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the company is insolvent, or
would become insolvent.
The Proposal identified the threat of personal
liability of directors, combined with uncertainty over the precise moment a
company becomes insolvent, as a driver behind companies entering into voluntary
administration, even in circumstances where the company may be viable in the
long run. Due to a fear for liability, directors are disinclined to take
reasonable commercial risks to undertake a restructure plan.
Proposed
Safe Harbour
In recognition of the rigidness, the Australian Government
has formulated two alternative proposals for the introduction of a ‘safe
harbour’ either as a defence (Model A) or a carve-out (Model B) to the
insolvent trading offence.
Model A
Under Model A, it is proposed that it would be a
defence to insolvent trading offence if, at the time when the debt was
incurred, a reasonable director would have an expectation, based on advice provided
by a restructuring adviser, that the company can be returned to solvency
within a reasonable period of time, and the director is taking reasonable steps
to ensure it does so. The Proposal emphasised that the restructuring adviser
must be appropriately experienced, qualified and well informed of the company’s
financial position. Also, the restructuring adviser must be provided with
appropriate books and records within a reasonable period of their appointment
to enable them to form a view as to the viability of the business. The onus lies
with the company directors to ensure that the experience and qualifications of
the restructuring adviser were appropriate according to the nature and
circumstances of the company.
Model B
Model B, on the other hand, contemplates safe
harbour as a carve-out, rather than a defence. It provides that the insolvent
trading provision does not apply:
1.
if the debt was
incurred as part of reasonable steps to maintain or return the company to
solvency within a reasonable period of time; and
2.
the person held
the honest and reasonable belief that incurring the debt was in the best
interests of the company and its directors as a whole; and
3.
incurring the
debt does not materially increase the risk of serious loss to creditors.
As Model B operates as a carve-out, the burden of
proof would lie on the liquidator bringing a claim to show that a director had
breached any of the three limbs of the provision. According to the Proposal, the
early engagement with shareholder, creditors and appointment of appropriately
qualified and experienced restructuring adviser would form part of the “reasonable
steps” consideration.
Lessons
for Hong Kong
Back in mid-1990s, there was discussion in Hong
Kong regarding the introduction of an insolvent trading provision, which closely
mirrors the wrongful trading provision of the UK Insolvency Act 1986. The
purpose of the introduction of the insolvent trading provision is to encourage better
corporate governance. It was designed to raise the awareness of company directors
of their duty to creditors, rather than just having regard to the interests of
themselves or the shareholders.
At the same time, the Report of the Law Reform
Commission of Hong Kong on Corporate Rescue and Insolvent Trading (1996) recognized
that the insolvent trading provision should not be so harsh as to discourage
responsible persons from taking the time to consider, and to seek advice, as to
whether a company could be saved or go into liquidation. Nor should the
provision make the responsible persons more inclined to push companies into
voluntary liquidation or receivership unnecessarily, for fear of being made
liable for trading while insolvent. The Report also recognized that responsible persons who paid
attention to their business, and who took appropriate action when faced with
insolvency, should never face an application in respect of insolvent trading.
Despite great efforts of the Law Reform Commission,
the proposal on insolvent trading was eventually abandoned and now almost 20
years later, no such law has been enacted in Hong Kong. However, over the
years, the Hong Kong Court has, within the restraint, gradually developed the
law relating to insolvent trading. In the case of Re Ching Hing Construction Co Ltd [2001] HKEC 1402, the
Court held that if the directors of a company continue to trade when the
company is making losses and when it should have been apparent that there was
no real prospect that the company would return to
profitability, the Court may draw the inference that the directors’ decision
was improperly influenced by their desire to continue in office and in control
of the company and to draw remuneration and other benefits for themselves. Such
finding is capable to ground a misfeasance claim against the directors under
section 276 of the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions)
Ordinance (Cap 32).
Further, in the matter of Moulin Global Eyecare Holdings Limited
(in liquidation) & Ors v Olivia Lee Sin Mei [2012] 4 HKLRD 263,
(2014) 17 HKCFAR 466, Barma J, remarkably, allowed the liquidator to add a
claim based on increase in net deficiency. In essence, the liquidator claimed
that at material time, the defendant, acting as a non-executive director of the
company, knew or ought to have known, that the company was insolvent and there
was no hope to trade out of insolvency. She should have procured the
appointment of provisional liquidators, or otherwise blown the whistle. But she
did not. Instead, she left the company to trade on and as a result, there was
an increased net deficiency of HK$1.23 billion by the time the company was
wound up. On appeal, Barma J’s order was set aside, but restored by the Court
of Final Appeal. While the final outcome is still pending, the Moulin case demonstrates the
possibility of a claim based on insolvent trading.
In around 2009, the Financial
Services and Treasury Bureau has undertaken a review of the Corporate Rescue Scheme
and, among other things, proposed to introduce a new insolvent trading
provision. Public consultation was also launched to solicit views on the
legislative proposals. But it is now unclear when the relevant proposals would
be introduced into the Legislative Council. Nevertheless, it is submitted that
the Australian Government’s proposal on “safe harbour” is of good reference
value for Hong Kong, as it strikes a better balance between encouraging
entrepreneurship and protecting creditors. Also, it is submitted that the Model B, which
is similar to the model adopted in the UK Insolvency Act, might work
better in the Hong Kong context, as it allows the directors of distressed
companies to spare more time on working out a plausible restructure plan, which
is in the best interest of the company as a whole.
For enquiries, please contact our Litigation
& Dispute Resolution Department: |
E:
insolvency@onc.hk T:
(852) 2810 1212 19th Floor, Three
Exchange Square, 8 Connaught Place, Central, Hong Kong |
Important: The law and
procedure on this subject are very specialised and complicated. This article is just a very general outline for
reference and cannot be relied upon as legal advice in any individual case.
If any advice or assistance is needed, please contact our solicitors. |
Published by ONC Lawyers © 2016 |