What happens when a creditor petitions to wind up a company already subject to an unfair prejudice petition?
Introduction
In a recent Court of First Instance case Li Fu Hua (also known as Denise Li) v
Chen Ching Chih (陳清治) and another HCMP 1374/2018,
[2018] HKCFI 2786, the court has to deal with the situation where a creditor
filed a winding up petition (on ground of insolvency) against a company in
respect of which a minority shareholder has already filed an unfair prejudice
petition against the majority shareholder and the company.
Chronology
1.
On 31 August
2018, the former petitioner (the “Petitioner”)
presented an unfair prejudice petition (the “Petition”) against Chen Ching Chih (the “1st Respondent”) and Prosperous Global China Holding
Limited (the “Company”) was joined
as a nominal party. In the Petition, the Petitioner argued that she was wrongly
excluded from the management of the Company by the 1st Respondent
and there were various breaches of the articles of association committed by the
1st Respondent. The Petitioner relied on such unfairly prejudicial
conducts committed by the 1st Respondent to seek equitable relief
from the court.
2.
On 6 September
2018, Yi Chun Navigation Inc. (the “Creditor”)
who was controlled by the 1st Respondent served a statutory demand
for repayment of a debt on the Company.
3.
On 24 September
2018, the Petitioner issued the 1st Amendment Summons to amend the
Petition (the “1st Amendment
Summons”) and presented a contributory’s winding up petition against the 1st
Respondent and the Company (the “Contributory
Winding Up Petition”).
4.
On 28 September
2018, the Creditor presented a creditor’s winding up petition against the
Company (the “Creditor’s Winding Up
Petition”).
5.
On 3 October
2018, the Petition was listed for hearing. In view of the pending Creditor’s
Winding Up Petition which the court was told would be uncontested, the court
ordered a temporary stay of the Petition including the 1st Amendment
Summons.
6.
On 27 November
2018, the Petitioner nevertheless issued the 2nd Amendment Summons
seeking substantive amendments to the Petition (the “2nd Amendment Summons”).
7.
On 10 December
2018, winding up order was made against the Company on the Creditor’s Winding
Up Petition.
8.
On 17 December
2018, Deputy High Court Judge William Wong SC (the “Judge”) decided that the Petition should be struck out or dismissed
and the Petitioner then applied to withdraw the Petition. Since the withdrawal
was not opposed by the 1st Respondent, the Judge made an order that
the Petition be withdrawn by consent.
Rationale of the
Judge’s decision
Rationale
for striking out the Petition
Firstly, the Judge decided that there is no reason
for the Petition to hang over the 1st Respondent when in reality there
is no prospect that the Petition would be heard. The relief as prayed by the
Petitioner could never be granted in view of the winding up of the Company.
Secondly, with the winding up of the Company, the
liquidators should be the one to investigate any wrongdoings against the
Company. Therefore, there is no utility in maintaining the Petition.
Therefore, the Judge is of the view that Petition should
be struck out or dismissed if the Petitioner did not apply for a withdrawal.
Rationale
for the Petitioner to pay costs
The general rule regarding costs is that the party
who applies to withdraw an action or any proceedings would bear the costs,
unless the applicant shows a good reason for departing from that position. To
displace the presumption, the applicant will usually need to show a change of
circumstances to which he has not himself contributed and is brought by some
form of unreasonable conduct on the other party. The fact that the applicant would
or might well have succeeded at trial is not itself a sufficient ground for departing
from the general rule but if it is plain that the claim would have failed, that
is an additional factor favouring the presumption. Meanwhile, the motivation of
withdrawal due to practical, pragmatic or financial reasons as opposed to a
lack of confidence in the merits of the case will not suffice to displace the
presumption.
Firstly, the Judge decided that the winding up
order made on 10 December is not a change of circumstances caused by some form
of unreasonable conduct on the 1st Respondent. The Judge has
considered that the Creditor was controlled by the 1st Respondent at
the material time but he decided that there is nothing to suggest that the
presentation of the Creditor’s Winding Up Petition is improper.
Secondly, the Judge decided that it is not necessary
to determine the merits of the Petitioner’s grounds of petition at such stage.
It is also not a sufficient reason to depart from the general rule even if the
Petitioner would or might well have succeeded at trial.
Thirdly, the Judge decided that it is an irrelevant
consideration to depart from the general rule even the Petition was presented
well before the statutory demand served by the Creditor because the Petitioner
has then applied for withdrawal.
Lastly, the Petitioner confirming that the Company being
insolvent in her Contributory Winding Up Petition has rendered such petition an
inappropriate one. The 1st Respondent is entitled to argue that the
Petitioner has no interest to present and continue the Petition.
Therefore, the Judge ordered the Petitioner to pay
the 1st Respondent’s costs.
Is
that a fair result?
It is
questionable whether the costs order made by the Judge is a fair one. The
Petitioner may have genuine grievance against the 1st Respondent but before it
could be heard, a creditor related to the 1st Respondent filed a winding up
petition against the Company. Whilst the Petitioner did not dispute that the
Company was insolvent and should be wound up, it does not necessarily mean that
the Petitioner could not proceed with the unfair prejudice petition and obtain
reliefs under such petition (such as a buy-out order based on a valuation at a
date when the Company was still solvent). Apparently the Judge’s decision is
very much based on the fact that the Petitioner chose to withdraw the Petition.
But he was also of the view that the Petition should be withdrawn as he
mentioned that any wrong-doing of the 1st Respondent, if any, should be
investigated by the liquidators instead. With respect, this was not a very
practical suggestion. Liquidators could be very expensive and the Company seems
to have little assets to finance such investigation. More importantly, if the
Petitioner’s complaint is unjustifiable exclusion from management, this is not
something that a liquidator should be concerned as it was not a wrong done to
the Company. Hence, it is submitted that whether the general presumption that
those withdrawing the petition should pay the respondent costs should be
displaced in situation like the present case is a question that remains
debatable.
For enquiries, please contact our Litigation
& Dispute Resolution Department: |
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insolvency@onc.hk T:
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Important: The law and
procedure on this subject are very specialised and complicated. This article is just a very general outline for
reference and cannot be relied upon as legal advice in any individual case.
If any advice or assistance is needed, please contact our solicitors. |
Published by ONC Lawyers © 2019 |