Refund of Taxes Paid Pursuant to Inflated Profits?
In Moulin Global Eyecare Trading Limited (in liquidation) v The
Commissioner of Inland Revenue, FACV 5/2013, the Court of Final Appeal
held that the guilty knowledge of the fraudulent directors should be attributed
to the company in a claim by the
liquidators under section 64 or 70A of the Inland
Revenue Ordinance to claim a refund of profits taxes paid.
Background
The profits of Moulin Global Eyecare Trading Limited (“MGET”)
had been fraudulently inflated over the tax years 1998/1999 to 2003/2004 by its
then management. Assessments of profits
tax were made pursuant to the returns prepared based on such inflated profits
and were therefore
excessive. MGET was wound up on 5 June
2006. The liquidators claimed a refund
of the profits taxes paid under sections 64 and 70A of the Inland Revenue
Ordinance (Cap. 112) (“IRO”).
Under section 64(1)(a) of the IRO, a taxpayer has 1 month after the
date of the assessment to give notice of objection thereto with the possibility
of an extension, if the Commissioner of Inland Revenue is satisfied that owing
to some reasonable cause the taxpayer was prevented from giving the said notice
within the 1-month period.
Under section 70A, a taxpayer may obtain tax
repayment if, upon application made within 6
years after the end of a year of assessment, it is established to the satisfaction of an assessor that the tax charged
for that year of assessment is excessive by reason of an error or omission in
any return or statement submitted in respect thereof.
The
Commissioner of Inland Revenue rejected the claims of the liquidators. The liquidators applied for judicial review
where Justice Reyes decided in favour of the liquidators and ordered the
Commissioner to reconsider her decisions.
The Court of Appeal allowed the Commissioner’s appeal and set aside Justice
Reyes’s orders. In essence, the Court of
Appeal decided that the fraudulent knowledge of MGET’s management that the profits
had been inflated should be attributed to MGET such that MGET had not been
prevented from giving notice of objection within time nor was there any error
within the meaning of s 70A. The Court
of Final Appeal granted leave to appeal so that the law relating to
attribution could be considered.
Attribution of Knowledge
Rules of Attribution
Since a company is an entity existent solely because of legal
creation, the conduct or state of mind of one or more natural persons is to be
attributed as that of the company for the purpose of determining the company’s legal liability or rights in civil proceedings.
The Court of Final Appeal in the present case took the opportunity to
discuss the rules and exceptions on such attribution.
The Court of Final Appeal endorsed the tripartite classification of
rules of attribution in Meridian
Global Funds Management Asia Limited v Securities Commission [1995] 2
AC 500
(“Meridian”). First, primary
rules of attribution are to be derived from company law statutes and the articles
of association of the company concerned.
Second, there are general rules of attribution which are equally
available to natural persons, namely, the principles of agency. And third, special rules of attribution are
to be fashioned by the court by determining the intention of the legislature
from the statutory language, purpose and context.
The Fraud Exception
On the other hand,
previous authorities show that the fraudulent state of mind of directors and
employees will in certain cases not be attributed to the corporate
employer. This is to avoid the injustice
and absurdity of directors or employees relying on their own awareness of their own wrongdoing
as a defence to a claim against them by their own corporate employer (“redress”
category). But the exception does not
apply to protect a company where the issue is whether the company is liable to
a third party for the dishonest conduct of a director or employee (“liability”
category).
Attribution in the
Present Case
In the present case, by
applying the primary rules of attribution, the fraudulent directors should be
the obvious persons whose knowledge should be attributed to MGET, unless the
fraud exception applies to exclude such attribution.
The liquidators’ claim
against the Commissioner of Inland Revenue was held less capable of fitting
comfortably into either of the “liability” and
“redress” categories, after the Court of Final Appeal considered the
Commissioner’s role and responsibilities.
The Commissioner is not the accomplice of a fraudster. The Commissioner is a third party from whom a
corporate employer hopes to recoup, indirectly, part of a loss that it has
suffered as the result of a director’s or employee’s misconduct. But the Commissioner cannot be expected to
make inquiries about a taxpayer’s business in such a way as to become well
acquainted with it. Furthermore, the
Commissioner’s functions, powers and obligations are to be found wholly in the
sphere of public law, and in particular in the IRO. An essential part of the scheme of the IRO is
that the Commissioner should be able to make assessments on the basis of the
taxpayer’s returns. It would frustrate
this statutory purpose if the fraud exception were to intrude into this scheme.
The liquidators cannot
therefore rely on the proviso to section 64(1) of the IRO, because MGET was not
prevented from lodging an objection within time; it chose not to do so. Nor can the liquidators rely on section 70A,
because MGET must be taken as having known that its returns were false, and a
deliberate lie is not an “error” for the purposes of that section.
Interpretation of
Sections 64 and 70A
Further to the above
analysis on attribution, the Court of Final Appeal held that sections 64 and
70A of the IRO would not be applicable in the present case.
The Court of Final Appeal
noted in Monro v HMRC [2009]
Ch 69 that the state has a legitimate interest in ensuring finality in fiscal
transactions. Against this underlying
policy, the Court of Final Appeal held that the legislature regarded it as
inconceivable that a reasonable extension of the short period of 1 month under
section 64 of the IRO could ever amount to years. Further, there must be a clear causal
connection between the reasonable cause and the prevention. Even in the absence of attribution to MGET of
the guilty knowledge of the fraudulent directors, the Court of Final Appeal
found it difficult to regard MGET as having been “hijacked” and quoted Lord
Hoffmann in Meridian that “There is in fact no such thing as the company as such, no ding an sich, only the applicable
rules”.
For section 70A, it was
held that its scope is restricted by the need for an error in a return or an
accompanying statement. Even if the
guilty knowledge of the fraudulent directors is not attributed to MGET, the Court
of Final Appeal found it difficult to view the proposed substitution of an
entirely new return and set of statements, as correction of a specific error;
everything would have to be rewritten.
Conclusion
The Court of Final Appeal authoritatively decided against the application of the fraud exception in a claim for refund of excessive taxes paid because of inflated profits caused to be reported by fraudulent directors. In recouping the excessive profits taxes paid in such circumstances, the liquidators could not claim against the Commissioner of Inland Revenue; but they could possibly claim against the auditors (in negligence) apart from the fraudulent directors themselves (in breach of service contract, breach of fiduciary duty and/or deceit).
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Published by ONC Lawyers © 2014 |